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THE DIVERGENT AND EVOLVING LEGAL PATHWAYS OF FUTURE SPACE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT 
COLLABORATION 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Collaboration in space traffic management efforts is critical to the successful continued use of 
the outer space environment, and exploration and utilization of space assets will depend upon 
structured legal guidance.  While STM is notionally evolving at the international level, 
appropriate attention must also be given to national strategies.  This paper will elucidate that 
extant space traffic management methodologies are developing along two disparate tracks.  
These pathways, which here are termed the international-collaborative and domestic-sectarian 
methods, are reflective of the needs of the international community and intrastate interests 
respectively.  The paper will attempt to show that in the near-term, these two methodologies 
will co-exist as they are developed and begin to mature; moreover, in the near to mid-term, the 
sectarian method will develop more rapidly in order to accommodate pressing national needs.  
Furthermore, the paper will demonstrate that as national dependency on space assets 
continues to grow, pressure will encourage proportional international dialogue on best 
methods going forward.  Though this paper does not attempt to define the precise parameters 
of truly collaborative international STM, it does suggest that the history of space governance is 
filled with the cooperative efforts of nations working to resolve pressing international concerns 
(such as past and ongoing work with the International Space Station), and that the STM systems 
of the future will utilize these legal precedents in their collaborative efforts.  Necessarily, the 
STM systems of the future will include intrastate regulatory schemes designed to effectively 
service national needs whilst simultaneously respecting developing international standards. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In discussing space traffic management, one cannot help but hear the oft-uttered 
phrase: congested, competitive, contested.  These three C’s refer to the increasingly difficult 
aspect of utilizing the space environment.  This essay attempts to show that though the desire 
for an international STM system is strong, in the short-term, domestic legislation and regulatory 
authorities serve as the primary STM available for analysis.  Indeed, though States have been 
operating in space since the late 1950’s, the concept of developing a unifying operational 
theory for coordination of disparate national interests took a back seat to more pressing 
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concerns, such as preventing nuclear weaponry from finding its way into space.1  Though 
domestic, State-centric STM is the currently utilized model, it is probable that, in time, the 
necessity of centralizing the rules pertaining to space traffic management will encourage 
international STM systems to take their place in the field. 
 
This essay aims to look at diverging paths for managing space by analyzing space actors 
with a view towards a very specific activity that, if all goes as planned in certain countries, will 
engage a host of new potentially dangerous traffic, along with a likely concomitant increase in 
the generation of orbital debris.  Below, the emerging field of space mining is the example used 
to illustrate domestic STM systems, in contrast to the dearth of such regulation in the 
international community more generally. 
 
Finally, this essay argues that while an international STM scheme would benefit States 
most in the long run, the parallel construction of new and more comprehensive domestic laws 
will continue to benefit both industry and governments in the short term.  Encouraging both of 
these systems to develop is complimentary, since what is seen today in domestic systems (like 
the agency scheme utilized by the United States to govern its space activities) will be useful in 
informing the structure of future international systems. 
 
                                                     
1 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, art. IV, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 
U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter the Outer Space Treaty or OST]. 
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DIVERGENT PATHWAYS 
Governance of space activities has been developing along predictable pathways for 
decades.  Ever since its genesis with the United Nations Declaration of 19632, States have been 
carving out utilitarian methods for key governance of the outer space environment.  Yet, what 
once was predictable is becoming less so, given the increasingly congested nature of outer 
space.3  Currently, a divergent process exists whereby space traffic management develops along 
the parallel paths of domestic State law (a sectarian process) and international law (an 
international-collaborative process).  These efforts serve different groups and needs, yet they 
both aim towards enabling interested parties to maintain the peaceful use of outer space.  
Maintaining the right, and the concomitant ability to access that right, is of such importance to 
the international community, that it became the first rule ensconced in the flawed but mighty 
Magna Carta4 of outer space—the Outer Space Treaty.5  The OST and its progeny have been 
successful at establishing many aspects of the proper use of space, some of which have obvious 
ramifications for space traffic management6, and some of which deal with the intricacies of 
                                                     
2 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space [General Assembly Resolution 1962 (XVIII) of 13 December 1963]. 
3 NASA has noted that there are more than 500,000 space objects being tracked, a number sure 
to grow with time, http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/news/orbital_debris.html. 
4 ‘The Outer Space Treaty has been rightly recognized as the Magna Carta of space law, but its 
provisions are just not definite enough to handle the complex issue of space debris and the 
advancements in technology.” N. Jasentuliyana, Space Debris and International Law, 26 J. Space 
L. 2 (1998), at 139. 
5 “The exploration and use of outer space…shall be carried out for the benefit and in the 
interests of all countries…shall be the province of all mankind…shall be free for exploration and 
use by all States….”, OST art. I, supra note 1. 
6 Id. at art. IV (prohibition of military maneuvers on celestial bodies). 
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space exploration.7  However, no current system exists under international law that effectively 
governs what States and non-governmental entities may do in space vis-à-vis STM.  The drafters 
of the OST regime set the stage, but they did not finish the task, and in turn the very freedom 
celebrated by the treaties has allowed activities to flourish that now threaten the long-term use 
of the space realm. 
 
The space traffic management of today is a hodge-podge of domestic legislation and 
voluntary international collaboration.  A great critique of the OST regime (or compliment, 
depending on the position taken) is that it dared not to establish the rules of the road, beyond 
what was absolutely necessary to encourage and permit the exploration of space.  However, 
while STM has yet to find its proper home in the halls of international law, there is reason to 
believe that eventually, the pressure of continued usage of space will encourage States to work 
together to manage an area of such paramount importance to their myriad needs.  Below, this 
essay briefly examines the possible structure of future international systems.  Until that time, 
current national efforts will continue to reflect the propagating needs of space-utilizing States. 
 
Indeed, in the absence of relevant, well-developed international guidance, States have 
been left to their own design to launch and manage their space assets.  This has resulted in the 
extant state of affairs, whereby States acting in space have developed their own domestic, or 
sectarian methods for controlling their space activities.  Similar themes may crop up in the 
                                                     
7 Id. at art. V (description of astronauts as “envoys of all mankind”). 
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domestic legislation of the space-capable States8, although they are always tailored specifically 
to the needs of the promulgating State9.  On the one hand, this produces a dilemma, in that 
there are STM efforts underway by various States that are externally inconsistent with one 
another, even though they share the goal of safe management of space assets.  On the other, 
systems in place by space actors can serve as ready-made exemplars of methodologies that 
could, if properly modified, inform the creation of eventual international STM norms. 
 
As of this writing, there is every indication that space traffic management schemes will 
continue to develop at both the State and International levels, convergently, until such time as 
further activity in space is exceptionally difficult, if not impossible, without directed 
international cooperation.  However, the time when such cooperative activity becomes 
necessary may not be long in coming. 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF SPACE MINING FOR STM 
                                                     
8 As an example, the United Kingdom Outer Space Act of 1986 requires any “person to whom 
this Act applies” to acquire a license in order to launch objects into space (UK Outer Space Act 
of 1986, Sec. 3.-1).  The United States Commercial Space Launch Act as Amended has 
substantially the same requirements, as found in 51 U.S.C. § 50904(a)(1). 
9 Every State has its own reasons for entering and utilizing space.  In the United States, one such 
reason is to commercialize activities in space.  The same statute that requires a license for 
space launches is also designed to encourage private space activity: “the Secretary of 
Transportation…in carrying out this chapter…shall…encourage, facilitate, and promote 
commercial space launches and reentries by the private sector….” 51 U.S.C. § 50903(a)(b)(1).  
Directly involving the government in developing a private space launch sector has been a long-
standing policy meant to effectuate specific interests of the United States since at least the 
mid-1980s. 
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Before ascertaining solutions to the more sophisticated problems of space traffic 
management, such as orbital debris, orbital navigation, or traffic collision methodology, States 
will need to answer basic international law questions about their planned activities.  Some of 
these activities have become well-established, if not without controversy, such as orbital slot 
and frequency allocation for communications satellites.   
 
To illustrate a domestic-sectarian methodology for space traffic management, one can 
look to the system in place in the United States.  The United States utilizes the Commercial 
Space Launch Act as Amended10  (CSLAA) to permit, and encourage, its commercial entities to 
enter into space.  This is done for a host of reasons, such as the belief that commercial activity 
is good for foreign policy interests11, or that private activity in space will have economic 
benefits for the United States.12  To achieve these and other goals, the United States 
established a system whereby minimal licensing would be necessary for private space launches 
(believing, no doubt, that an overregulated field would discourage private engagement in 
space), and gave wide authority to the Secretary of Transportation to facilitate space activity.13 
 
There are also newer uses for space that have captured the attention of the media, such 
as the recent proposals by the U.S. House of Representatives to facilitate mining on celestial 
                                                     
10 Public Law 108-492 (2004).  See also 51 U.S.C. § 509 et. seq. 
11 Commercial Space Launch Act as Amended, 51 U.S.C. 50901(6). 
12 Id. at § 50901(2). 
13 Id. at § 50903(1)(a)b)(1). 
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bodies.14  It is proposals such as these that require a more basic analysis.  Indeed, while the 
particularity of domestic-sectarian methods for STM can be demonstrated in a number of ways, 
from orbital debris management policy, to more general space activities management via 
federal agency15, encouraging the development of privatized mining operations brings with it a 
host of conceptual and practical concerns.  If this new field of industrial mining becomes a 
reality, it could provide a model of how other space activities could be managed by 
governments, and the lessons learned from these endeavors will be invaluable in generating 
successful STM structures for the future. 
 
While the U.S. does not currently authorize space-mining activities, the efforts of the 
House of Representatives have been turned towards creating the regulatory structure needed 
to facilitate the industry.  The House bill is designed to give governmental approval to private 
organizations interested in and capable of mining operations.  In a sense, this comports with 
the spirit of the CSLAA, in that it furthers previous legislative action to serve the various 
interests of the United States in space by encouraging its commercialization.  Predominantly, it 
requires the President to reduce the barriers to entrants in this field, but it also provides a 
property right to any in situ resources acquired through space mining.16  If the Senate is able to 
                                                     
14 Fung, Brian, The House Just Passed a Space Mining Bill. The Future is Here, The Washington 
Post, May 22, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/05/22/the-
house-just-passed-a-bill-about-space-mining-the-future-is-here/. 
15 See, e.g., Susan Willshire, Patch or Rebuild: a Comparative Analysis of Multi-Agency regime 
vs. Single-Agency Regime within US Domestic Space Traffic Management Regulation, Embry-
Riddle Aeronautical University Scholarly Commons, (STM Conference 2014). 
16 “Any asteroid resources obtained in outer space are the property of the entity that obtained 
such resources, which shall be entitled to all property rights thereto, consistent with applicable 
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reach an agreement with the House on this or a similar bill, the President would be able to sign 
space-mining into existence.  For industry, this could be a boon; however, the absence of clear 
on-orbit authorities to govern how these new participants in the space environment act is of 
some concern.  Even before this problem is addressed, the Congress itself has taken to arguing 
over the legal validity of the proposed law. 
 
The majority (of members acting to pass the bill) claims sufficient attention and respect 
is given to international law, but the minority vociferously opposes this viewpoint.  The majority 
claims that the bill not only respects international obligations, but actually gives effect to those 
same provisions.  The argument is such that international law that binds the United States must 
be given substance through domestic legislation—otherwise, the obligation is ineffective within 
the United States.17  If this regime becomes a reality, the question of on-orbit authority, and 
therefor how to manage the additional, possibly significant, space traffic remains.  Not having a 
capable management scheme in place before sending spacecraft towards this new venture 
could create a host of new difficulties, and it certainly continues the theme of making space 
more “crowded”, and, in potentially spurring similar economic endeavors from other States, 
more “competitive”.  The “contested” prong of the oft-utilized three C’s phrase is also 
implicated, and perhaps serves as the greatest source of consternation amongst potential 
international opposition to the plan.  If the mining regime is, in fact, a unilateral attempt to 
                                                     
provisions of Federal law and existing international obligations.” H.R. 1508, 114th Cong. § 
51303(a). 
17 See Report on the Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act of 2015, Report no. 114-
153, 114th Congress (1st Session), House of Representatives, June 15, 2015. [House Report]. 
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authorize an appropriation of in situ resources on celestial bodies in violation of Article II of the 
Outer Space Treaty, then permitting the activity to occur under the auspices and blessings of 
the United States could potentially engender international “bad will”, and complicate future 
cooperative endeavors involving the U.S. and the rest of the international community. 
 
Another interpretation, contrary to concern above, is that the space-mining operations 
will not be violative of any international obligations.  If the “use” described under Article I of 
the OST includes extraction of resources found on celestial bodies, then any State attempting to 
undertake mining procedures would be exercising their international rights.  However, this does 
not solve the issue of mining spacecraft in or on orbit, without a centralized national or 
international body to govern the actions of the space actor.  All that is certain, from the 
perspective of the United States, is that the FAA’s Office for Commercial Space Transportation 
would have to authorize the launch and reentry of the vehicle used.18 
 
The most obvious concern with space mining is that of the permissibility of the activity 
in the first place.  The proposed mining operations could be viewed as unilateral in nature, since 
they cater to the individual needs of a single State, and are created without direct 
countervailing international interests to guide formation of new regulation.  This is not to say 
that, necessarily, international law obligations have been or will be ignored in favor of 
individual State practice, but the level of accessibility those international norms have with 
                                                     
18 The AST facilitates the required licensing procedure established in chapter 509 of Title 51.  
See, http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/licenses_permits/. 
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domestic laws will vary with regard to State respect for those norms and their comparative 
value to competing State interest.   One of the key criticisms of the proposed House legislation 
is that it fails to follow critical and well-understood international prohibitions on the 
appropriation of celestial bodies.19   
 
The Outer Space Treaty clearly and definitively prohibits the appropriation of territory in 
outer space, or on celestial bodies.20  This is true whether this is done by use or occupation, or 
“by any other means”.21  While mining on planetary bodies is likely a distant possibility, there 
are arguments that such operations on asteroids could exist without offending these strict 
prohibitions.  After all, industry is more concerned with the mineral and other resources to be 
found than with claims over entire bodies.  The House of Representatives has made this very 
argument in recent bills, starting with the failed ASTEROIDs Act22, and culminating in the now 
pending H.R. 2262.23  Some have argued that these bills, despite their claim that only in situ 
resources are to be appropriated, nevertheless fail Article II’s “by any other means” test.24  
Determining the legal permissibility of these activities is beyond the scope of this essay, and, in 
any event, there are already scholarly pieces that address the issue in-depth.25  Thus, the rest of 
the essay presumes that if such activities did not violate the OST, there would nevertheless be 
                                                     
19 “Minority Views”, House Report, supra note 16, at 20. 
20 OST, supra note 1, at art. II. 
21 Id. 
22 H.R. 1508, 113th Cong. [ASTEROIDS Act]. 
23 H.R. 2262, 114th Cong. (This bill is a larger House bill accounting for several space matters for 
the U.S. government. H.R. 1508 was a smaller bill that was absorbed into this larger one.) 
24 “Minority Views”, supra note 19, at 20 (citing the advice of Prof. Joanne Gabrynowicz). 
25 See, e.g., Ricky Lee, Article II of the Outer Space Treaty: Prohibition of State Sovereignty, 
Private Property Rights, or Both?, 11 Austl.n Int’l L.J. 128 (2004). 
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other international law concerns that need addressing before proper space traffic management 
systems can be implemented. 
 
Assuming, arguendo, States begin authorizing their agencies or non-governmental 
actors to mine resources from asteroids, successful operations will require special emphasis to 
be placed on Articles VI and IX of the Outer Space Treaty.  Whatever the problems for STM that 
could arise from developing the space mining industry, the requirements of Art. VI of the OST 
are arguably not among them.  The United States can claim that H.R. 1508, in conjunction with 
the licensing provisions of the CSLAA, properly effectuates the rule of law established under 
OST Art. VI.  Indeed, where the OST requires authorization and continuous supervision by a 
State of its non-governmental entities26, the CSLAA authorizes (via licensing), and supervises 
(via safety requirements from the Secretary of Transportation), and H.R. 1508 creates another 
layer of authorization in the way having the President expedite the space mining process.  
These supervisory activities constitute part of the STM regime employed by the United States—
the U.S. knows where and when its actors enter into space, and this enables them to track and 
monitor the activities, and any potential difficulties they may cause or encounter. 
 
The space mining efforts of the House also trigger an Article IX analysis.  That article sets 
an affirmative obligation for cooperation in space activities.27  It also sets forth the 
requirements for consultation, where one State must inform another should the former believe 
                                                     
26 OST, supra note 1, at art. VI. 
27 Id. at art. IX. 
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its space activities might interfere with the latter’s peaceful uses of outer space.28  It may also 
require States to work together to preserve the outer space environment to ensure their 
mining activities do not prevent the sustainable use of space as contemplated by Article I of the 
OST.  Each of these factors have obvious implications for STM—preserving the space 
environment is a primary goal of orbital debris mitigation29, and the conceptual siblings of 
cooperation and consultation are critical toward that and other STM goals. 
 
Recognizing the historical and legal importance of cooperation and consultation to 
space law, both domestic and international space traffic management methodologies would do 
well to integrate the lessons of the past to create efficacious systems for the future.  Indeed, 
the foundations of space law, from the Outer Space Treaty until, at least, the Registration 
Convention, were created with deference to the process of consent of States through 
consensus.30  The treaty regime was not set in place by contentious voting, or bedeviled with 
political infighting over which State would most benefit from its provisions.  While 
disagreements existed, States undertook to engage the spirit of peaceful uses of space, and 
maintained an orderly, if not always perfect, legislative process.  It is that spirit which can guide 
the next stages of STM management, both domestically, and internationally. 
                                                     
28 For an explanation of what activities constitute “consultation” under the Outer Space Treaty, 
see generally Michael Mineiro, FY-1C and U.S.A.-193 ASAT Intercepts: an Assessment of Legal 
Obligations under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, 34 J. Space L. 321 (2008). 
29 See, e.g., the U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices, 
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/usg_od_standard_practices.pdf; see also NASA 
Procedural Requirements NPR 8715.6A, available at 
http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/displayDir.cfm?t=NPR&c=8715&s=6A. 
30 See generally, Eilene Galloway, Consensus Decision Making by the United Nations Committee 
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 7 J. Space L. 3 (1979). 
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FUTURE CONVERGENCE 
The question, then, is when might a future system of STM designed to ameliorate the 
current ails of the current domestic-sectarian paradigm arise?  As indicated in the abstract to 
this essay, that time will likely come when States realize they have no other viable options that 
allow them to continue using space.  In the near-term, the parallel development of STM via 
domestic and international pathways will continue, and perhaps both will be furthered by new 
space activities such as space mining.  If the United States, or any other State, begins mining 
operations on celestial bodies, thereby demonstrating opinio juris that such activities are 
internationally valid, the pressure will be on for other States to do the same.  The major 
concern here would be in yet another space venture that encourages the creation and launch 
of more space objects, and the possibility of more collisions, on-orbit breakups, or 
accumulation of orbital debris from normal space activity. 
 
However, this need not be a purely negative development.  Indeed, encouraging 
commercial space providers (both domestically and internationally) to compete with one 
another, monitored closely by individual States at first, and, eventually, by an international 
body, could stimulate the development of the private sector in space traffic management 
regimes established for the future, whilst simultaneously engendering a more stable public-
private-partnership between States and their commercial providers.  Arguably, this could be a 
driver for the new “space age”, where more and more private actors are engaging in a field 
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once the exclusive province of national governments.31  How exactly that might happen is a 
subject for another essay, but with respect to space traffic management and commercial 
activity in space, competition between actors would, of necessity, encourage the development 
of best-practices.  Unlike the normal scenario of the tragedy of the commons32, at the very least 
States would be encouraged to use on-orbit space wisely, lest they lose the ability to use it at all 
in the near future.  There is no time to wait for the tragedy to occur, and the importance of the 
potential loss of on-orbit services (and beyond) is one of the primary motivators for the 
creation of functional STM rules going forward. 
 
Ultimately, this could lead to private organizations taking a role in handling STM.  
Adding to the idea of the potential benefits of promoting private activity, such entities could be 
involved that  establish priority rights to space traffic, and could effectively purge the issue of 
the weight of internalized governmental barriers.33  A non-governmental entity could act as a 
single point of contact for sighting of orbital debris, and could be responsible for warning the 
various actors—governmental or private—of potential collisions on-orbit.34  This body could be 
domestic, allowing a single company to be a clearinghouse of information collected by 
government and corporate interests alike, and sharing critical information with anyone who 
                                                     
31 Where once only the Space Shuttle supplied the International Space Station, now private 
entities have begun to fill that void.  See, e.g., Jason Paur, ISS Welcomes SpaceX Dragon—First 
Private Spacecraft at Station, Wired, May 25, 2012, http://www.wired.com/2012/05/spacex-
docking/. 
32 See generally, G. Hardin, The tragedy of the commons. 162 Science 1968, 1243–1248. 
33 Stephen Hunter, How to Reach an International Civil Aviation Organization Role in Space 
Traffic Management, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Scholarly Commons, (STM 
Conference 2014), at 10-11. 
34 Id. 
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requires it, but the theory could also be extended to an international non-governmental 
organization.  Similar entities have germinated that engage private resources before, albeit in a 
different context.  Trade organizations, like IATA35, have had noticeable impacts on the 
behavior of airlines from around the world.  Cooperation between various parties, even though 
they often exist in a state of business competition, has proven critical to enable the assertion of 
interests beneficial to all involved.36  Given the necessity for developing standards for collision 
avoidance, traffic guidance, and other on-orbit activities, it should not be inconceivable that a 
cooperative-minded international NGO could arise to obviate present STM difficulties.  This is 
especially true, should endeavors such as Virgin Galactic’s orbital tourism operations, or 
proposed U.S.-based mining operations demonstrate successful technology and profitable 
consequences from their activities.  Once proven, other corporations, States, and NGOs should 
quickly become invested in obtaining a measure of that market, and this would hasten the need 
for a trade body to lobby on behalf of the industry with the world’s various space-capable 
States.  Space could very well see NGOs taking the charge towards solving space traffic 
management woes long before an effective international body is established, especially given 
the myriad hurdles to creating such an international governing body. 
 
Of course, there are concerns with this solution.  IATA, for all of its abilities, does not 
generate law, or have the ultimate power to bind its members to its decisions or 
                                                     
35 International Air Transport Association, http://www.iata.org/about/Pages/index.aspx. 
36 For instance, IATA has used its influence to help shape the direction of environmental policy 
involving the use of aircraft.  See, http://www.iata.org/policy/environment/Pages/default.aspx. 
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recommendations.37  Furthermore, trade lobbies will have business interests as a first concern.  
While avoiding collisions in space, or preventing squabbles between mining entities on celestial 
bodies are in all parties’ best interests (whether they be States or private entities), the 
furtherance of international law will obviously be removed from their raison d’être.  In the end, 
international stability may well require some heretofore non-existent U.N. organ to take the 
reigns. 
 
Alternatively, a private organization could precede building an international STM body, 
perhaps something under the auspices of the United Nations, in a similar manner to the ICAO.  
Given the primitive nature of international attempts at universal STM to date, the exact nature 
and design of such a global body is largely speculative.  However, initially, attempts at 
constructing an international STM regime will most likely resemble soft-law creatures in effect 
today, such as the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee Guidelines (IADC 
Guidelines)38, or even the more rigorous United Nations Remote Sensing Principles.39  Both of 
these have effectively governed their respective arenas with modest success, and show that 
States are willing to follow systems that are not entirely rooted in the obligations of treaties. 
 
Whatever structure it takes, future international STM collaboration will depend on a 
new order of three C’s: Cooperation, Custom, and Consent.  In other arenas of space law, they 
                                                     
37 Clearly, there would be consequences for failing to play-along, but IATA’s positions do not 
have the same force as those taken by, e.g., ICAO, a body generated from the United Nations. 
38 IADC-02-01, available at http://www.iadc-online.org/index.cgi?item=docs_pub. 
39 United Nations Remote Sensing Principles, A/RES/41/65, 95th Plenary Meeting, Dec. 3, 1986. 
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have been highly successful.  Whether these concepts manage to replace congested, 
competitive, and contested, depends in part on whether, and when, States realize that there is 
no longer a moment of delay, and that continued utilization of space will depend on working 
towards a mutually acceptable, legally binding global superstructure. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Domestic legislation designed to reflect, and respect, international norms will serve 
States well in the near-term.  Such laws will not only enable States to maintain proper control 
over their space assets, but will also prime space-faring nations for more meaningful 
international STM cooperation in the future.  Systems like those of the CSLAA in the United 
States, coupled with the new era of private space launches to service governmental needs at 
the International Space Station (and elsewhere), have showcased successful domestic-sectarian 
methods of authorizing space activities.  These regulatory schemes represent one of the parallel 
strands of STM, along with the less-developed international efforts (such as debris mitigation 
guidelines).  While a centralized, international STM system of governance is appealing, its exact 
nature and legal authority remain speculative.  Furthermore, until States feel the pressure to do 
so, it is likely they will remain reticent to invest the direction of their space programs in an 
international body.  However, there is hope that out of the currently stagnate international 
efforts, a useful and globally respected regime, like that of ICAO with aviation, will develop once 
States realize how greatly their needs call for the stability such an entity could provide.  This has 
happened before, after all, in much the same way that the navigational booms of the 
renaissance era flourished and helped establish the law of the sea.  These laws slowly came 
 18 
about because of the utility of that realm, and the need of States to discern where in and what 
manner they could act.40  With increasing use of outer space, the very activities causing the 
celestial regions to become more congested, competitive, and contested will also help establish 
the need for truly international space traffic management. 
                                                     
40 Judge Lachs noted, “The seas became ever more populated and ships crossed them with ever 
greater facility.  Very early the need to establish generally binding principles and rules of 
navigation became manifest.  National claims to exclusive domination of the seas were bound 
to result in rivalry.  To open them to all…connoted the eventual necessity of co-operation.”  
MANFRED LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 12 (Tanja Masson-Zwaan & Stephan Hobe, eds. 2010) 
(2010). 
